On page 17 (of my edition at least), Hofstadter writes “While it is very simple to talk about language in language, it is not at all easy to see how a statement about numbers can talk about itself.” I understand the point that he is making here, trying to illustrate the fact that it’s hard to understand self-reference within number theory, but it seems strange to me that, within a chapter on the issues that arise because of self reference and “strange loops,” the author would assert the simplicity of self-referential language.

Maybe it’s just the fact that I spent last semester grappling with readings in Derrida and Heidegger that claimed that language can’t talk about itself that made that sentence set off alarm bells when I read it. Maybe I’m confusing two completely different ideas here and the problems of self-referential language are irrelevant to his comparison to number theory. But I feel like his example (on page 21) of a strange loop in language:

The following sentence is false.

The preceding sentence is true.

indicates that it is not exactly simple to “talk about language in language,” unless we interpret that claim to mean that it’s only simple to talk about language in language; not that it’s simple to achieve accuracy, relevancy or meaning by doing so. But then what is so simple - just to make words that seem to refer to language? In any case, I didn’t really know what to do with that sentence when I came across it. Thoughts?